Smoking Enzyme (Re)Confirms SARS2 Was Engineered

New EcoHealth documents add to mountain of evidence for synthetic origin.

Last spring we outlined the most compelling evidence the SARS2 virus was engineered, based on anomalous patterns in the genetic code itself. Now, new documents unearthed by Emily Kopp at U.S. Right to Know reinforce the hypothesis to an even greater extent.

In March 2023, we told you about the research of Alex Washburne, Valentin Bruttel, and Antonius VanDongen, which identified a molecular fingerprint strongly suggesting scientists had used a reverse genetics technique to stitch together a novel infectious clone, which we now call SARS2.

Scientists use a technique known as in vitro genome assembly (IVGA) to create infectious clones. The technology cuts the virus genome into regular pieces, which can then be removed, replaced, and altered to explore new characteristics. These cutting sites – called restriction sites because of the restriction enzymes used to cut – offer a convenient map for plug-and-play genomics. Natural viruses also have restriction sites; but they do not have such regularly sized or spaced chunks of code.

Washburne and colleagues showed that previous plug-and-play experimentation with SARS-like clones all cut the virus into between five and eight fragments. The fragment lengths were similar, too, with no extremely long fragments. They predicted that SARS2 would fit into the red box of known synthetic viruses below, and bingo; it did.

Washburne et al also reasoned that this technique would have specifically used BsaI and/or BsmBI enzymes to do the cutting. Once again, bingo.

Kopp’s new documents from 2018 add extra detail to our understanding of EcoHealth’s DEFUSE research. These include two crucial points which confirm predictions Washburne et al made without foreknowledge.

1. EcoHealth proposed to create the synthetic virus by stitching together six (6) segments, matching exactly Washburne et al’s interpretation of the SARS2 restriction sites.

2. EcoHealth listed the reagents needed to perform the experiments, including order numbers for large and small tubes of BsmBI, exactly the restriction enzyme Washburne et al said would be used in such a genome assembly.

Some have questioned whether the BsmBI enzyme find is important. Alone, maybe not, but as an additional piece of the puzzle, however tiny, which confirms a prediction, it is. “Having worked with these enzymes,” writes genomicist Kevin McKernan, “I wouldn’t order them for anything but seamless ligation/ Golden Gate assembly derivatives” – or exactly this type of genome synthesis.

It doesn’t really matter whether one calls this synthetic biology “gain of function” or not. U.S. government agencies funded the viral research with hundreds of millions of dollars. EcoHealth and UNC’s Ralph Baric performed some of the research and outsourced parts to Wuhan. In what portions, we don’t know. Anthony Fauci’s virology posse rained vicious personal assaults on Alex Washburne, Steven Quay, Matt Ridley, Alina Chan, Richard Ebright and others making reasoned arguments SARS2 might have been engineered.

The larger biomedical empire was catastrophically wrong not only about SARS2’s origin but also lockdowns, early treatment, and the safety and effectiveness of the vaccines. The result was soaring mortality and morbidity – from both Covid and especially non-Covid causes – across the middle- and high-income nations.

With spectacular certitude, they censored those who turned out to be right far more often than not. And they’re not finished yet. The FDA, CDC, and medical boards and journals are doubling down on the “misinformation” conceit and proposing yet more information lockdowns on doctors and scientists. Nearly 18 months after its posting as a pre-print, Washburne et al’s “Endonuclease Fingerprint” paper remains unpublished.

Against all odds, Twitter biomedicine won nearly every major Covid debate. But these narrow victories on rebel platforms leave large portions of the population mis- or underinformed. Pseudo-elite decision makers are among the most vulnerable. When those who believe they know the most actually know the least, systemic risk explodes.

We need new blood in our existing biomedical institutions and a major rethink of the institutions themselves. We need more diversification and competition, fewer fiefdoms, and a recommitment to open science – both to encourage innovation and head off major risks.